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Abstract 
 
Race theorists have been unable to reach a consensus regarding the basic historical question, 
“is ‘race’ modern?” I argue that this is partly because the question itself is ambiguous. There is 
not really one question that race scholars are answering, but at least six. First, is the concept of 
race modern? Second, is there a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race 
concepts? Third, are “races” themselves modern? Fourth, are racialized groups modern? Fifth, 
are the means and methods associated with racialization modern? And sixth, are the meanings 
attached to racialized traits modern? Because these questions have different answers, the 
debate about the historical origins of “race” cannot be resolved unless they are distinguished. I 
will explain the ways in which “race” is and is not modern by answering these questions, 
thereby offering a resolution to a seemingly intractable problem.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The dominant view among race scholars is that “race” is modern (Alcoff 2005; Goldberg 2002; 
Hannaford 1996; Holt 2002; Malik 1996; Mallon 2017; Mills 1998; Omi and Winant 2015; 
Smith 2015). In recent years, this view has been increasingly challenged. According to the 
continuity thesis, “race” had a real purchase before modernity (Bartlett 2001; Heng 2018; 
Lampert 2004; McCoskey 2012; Ramey 2014; Thomas 2010; Whitaker 2015). Does this view 
have any merit? Is “race” modern, or is it pre-modern? 
In this paper, I argue that race scholars have not been able to agree on an answer to this 
question partly because the question is ambiguous. There is not one question race scholars are 
answering when they locate “race” in historical time, but at least six. These are the questions 
race scholars are really answering: (1) Is the concept of race modern? (2) Is there a modern 
concept of race that is distinct from earlier race concepts? (3) Are “races” themselves modern? 
(4) Are racialized groups modern? (5) Are the means and methods associated with 
racialization modern? (6) Are the meanings attached to racialized traits modern? Sometimes 
it is clear which question race scholars are answering when they locate “race” historically, but 
often it is not. The last three questions tend not to be asked at all, even though the work of some 
race theorists is best interpreted as answering these questions. 
I will offer my own answers to these six questions in this paper. My hope, of course, is to 
convince the reader that these answers are correct, and thus to offer a viable solution to the 
debate about “race” and periodicity. However, this is a secondary aspiration, and the success 
of the paper does not turn on whether my particular answers are accepted. My primary goal for 
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the paper is to show that disambiguating the question “is ‘race’ modern?” is helpful for thinking 
about ‘race’ and racialization historically. 
It is worth noting from the outset that just as some race theorists have been questioning the 
modernity of “race,” some historians have been questioning periodization itself. As leading 
continuity theorist Geraldine Heng explains, these historians,  
 
working against the grain, have attempted to disrupt the narrative of scientific, economic, and demographic 
transformation separating modern from premodern time in the West… they have argued for the legitimacy 
of complex, nonlinear temporalities: temporalities in which multiple modernities have recurred in different 
vectors of the world moving at different rates of speed within macrohistorical time. One position… [sees] 
human history as punctuated by scientific and technological “efflorescences” that, coupled with labor 
specialization and intensive market orientation, have driven both Schumpeterian and Smithian growth and 
change in various societies and various eras, thus muddying the monomythic simplicity of a radical break 
favoring the West in modernity’s singular arrival (Heng 2018, 21). 
 
The periodization of history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods has been maintained 
despite the critiques to which Heng alludes (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991; Goldstone 2002). This is 
perhaps unsurprising, given the entrenched structuring of both university history departments 
and professional history journals according to the tripartite model.  
While Heng is a staunch critic of periodization, she still names her recent book The Invention 
of Race in the European Middle Ages (Heng 2018). In light of her critical stance, we can view 
Heng’s periodization as merely conventional. That is, she uses the tripartite division of history 
without believing that history comes neatly parceled into three coherent units of time. While it 
may be useful to eventually move away from the tripartite model, I will also adopt a 
conventionalist attitude toward periodization in this paper. Specifically, I will adopt the 
conventional dating of the beginning of modernity at 1492, the year Columbus arrived in the 
“New World” and the Jews were expelled from Spain.  
In response to the first question, which asks whether the concept of race is modern, I will 
answer in the negative: the concept of race is late medieval. It appears to have emerged for the 
first time at around the middle of the fifteenth century, in Spain. In response to the second 
question, which asks whether there is a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race 
concepts, I will answer in the affirmative: the concept of race changes enough for it to be useful 
to distinguish between modern and pre-modern race concepts. If my answers to the first two 
questions are correct, it should already be clear why asking whether “race” is modern needs 
disambiguation. If we simply ask whether the concept of race simpliciter is modern, we collapse 
questions one and two. Because questions one and two have different answers—or so I will 
argue—this is a recipe for confusion.  
The question “is ‘race’ modern?” is ambiguous in another way. “Race” is not only a concept; 
it is also a purported kind. The third question asks whether “races” themselves are modern. 
How we answer this question will depend on how we define “race” and whether there are any 
human races. If “race” is defined biologically, and there are human biological races, then races 
would be transhistorical groups. However, racial naturalism is increasingly rejected by 
scientists, at least in the West (see Wagner et al. 2017). I find the arguments against racial 
naturalism convincing, and for the purposes of this paper I will assume that “race” is not a 
biological kind (for some recent critiques of racial naturalism see Atkin 2017; Hochman 2016, 
2019a; Templeton 2013). 
The non-existence of biological races does not necessarily mean that we cannot sensibly ask 
whether races themselves are modern. As W. E. B. Du Bois wrote in The Conservation of 
Races, the “races… perhaps transcend scientific definition” but “nevertheless, are clearly 
defined to the eye of the Historian and Sociologist” (1897, 110). Analysis and evaluation of 
this claim has been central to the establishment of “race” as a topic of philosophical 
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investigation. In The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race Kwame 
Anthony Appiah argues that Du Bois didn’t go far enough in his racial skepticism. Appiah 
argues that like biologists, historians and sociologists should reject race as an illusion. In 
response, Paul Taylor criticizes Appiah for ushering “Du Bois into the light mainly to make 
visible what appear to him to be blemishes” (2000, 103). Taylor makes the case that Appiah’s 
critique of Du Bois’s racial realism fails, and that Du Bois’ “sociohistorical racialism is a viable 
conceptual option” (2000, 128). Indeed, the view that race is a social kind is now dominant 
among race scholars (Diaz-Leon 2015; Haslanger 2012; Mallon 2017; Mills 1998; Omi and 
Winant 2015; Sundstrom 2002; Taylor 2000). 
The third question can thus be interpreted as asking, “are social races modern?” My answer 
to this question will be the most controversial of all of my answers. Elsewhere I have argued 
that when a social approach to race is applied consistently, and taken to its logical conclusion, 
it has unacceptable theoretical consequences (Hochman 2017, 2019b). I make the case that 
when race is defined as a social kind, too many groups count as races and race loses its historical 
specificity (for a similar argument concerning racism, when understood culturally rather than 
biologically, see Seth 2005). So I will argue that races themselves are not modern, because 
“races” do not exist. 
The third question should be replaced by the fourth question: “are racialized groups 
modern?” The terms “race” and “racialized group” are usually used as synonyms (e.g. Goldberg 
1992; Haslanger 2000; Mallon 2018). However, there is an alternative tradition that 
distinguishes these concepts. In this tradition, “racialized group” is a category adopted by race 
skeptics as an alternative to “race” (see Blum 2002, 2010; Darder and Torres 2003; Hochman 
2017, 2019b; Miles 1988, 1989; Small 1994). “Race” is understood as a failed biological 
category, whereas a racialized group is conceptualized as a group that has been misinterpreted 
as a biological race. In response to the fourth question, I will argue that racialized groups first 
formed in the mid-fifteenth century, in Spain. If this is right, and we adopt the convention that 
modernity begins in 1492, or indeed any later date, then racialized groups are not modern. 
The fifth question asks whether the means and methods associated with racialization are 
modern. When race scholars find deep continuities between modern racist practices and earlier 
forms of discrimination they are tempted to claim that “race” is pre-modern. What they actually 
show, I will argue, is that some of the means and methods associated with racialization are pre-
modern.  
Similarly, when race scholars find historical continuities in the social meanings that are 
attached, for example, to skin color, they are tempted to claim that “race” is pre-modern (Hahn 
2001; Whitaker 2015). Skin color is, after all, the paradigmatic “racial” trait. However, I will 
argue that continuity theorists working on skin color are not well understood as answering the 
general question, “is ‘race’ modern?” Rather, they are best interpreted as answering the sixth 
question: “are the meanings attached to racialized traits modern?” They show that some of the 
meanings attached to some racialized traits are pre-modern in origin, although this is not to say 
that the significance attached to those traits is exactly the same throughout history. 
These questions about the history of “race” and racialization are important for theoretical 
and political reasons. On the theoretical side, it is crucial to distinguish between the six 
questions, because asking whether “race” is modern is insufficiently nuanced. There are both 
historical continuities and discontinuities relevant to racial concepts and racialized practices 
(see Hanchard 2018). My six questions can help us to capture both the relevant continuities and 
the relevant discontinuities. 
These theoretical issues feed into those of a political nature. A primary motivation for 
studying “race” is to help us understand and fight racism. If we want to know the historical 
conditions under which racism flourishes, then we need to know the history of racialization. As 
Heng notes, “Racial formation has been twinned with conditions of labor and capital in 
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modernity such as plantation slavery and the slave trade, the rise of capitalism or bourgeois 
hegemony, or modern political formations such as the state and its apparatuses (we think of 
David Theo Goldberg’s magisterial The Racial State), nations and nationalisms (Étienne 
Balibar’s chapters in Race, Nation, Class), liberal politics (Uday Mehta), new discourses of 
class and social war (Foucault of the 1975–6 Collège de France lectures), colonialism and 
imperialism (the work of many of us in postcolonial studies), and globalism and transnational 
networks (Thomas Holt on race in the global economy)” (2018, 16–17). However, if 
racialization precedes these allegedly modern institutions, then racism cannot depend on them. 
As a consequence, their abolition would not necessarily abolish racism. For reasons such as 
this, understanding the history of “race” and racialization may be helpful in the fight against 
racism. 
 
IS THE CONCEPT OF RACE MODERN? 
 
Let us consider each question in turn, beginning with the first, which asks whether the concept 
of race is modern. This question is often conflated with the second question, which asks 
whether there is a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race concepts. As Denise 
McCoskey writes, “So powerful and persistent is the “scientific” version of race, with its 
unyielding reference to the body’s surface and, above all, to skin color, that, as many scholars 
have argued, we tend to confuse it with the concept of race itself” (2006, 250). If race is 
understood to be a modern scientific concept, then there is no interesting debate to be had about 
the possible pre-modern origins of “race.” However, if we do not foreclose the debate by 
definitional fiat, we can meaningfully ask whether there was a concept of race before 
modernity.  
As David Nirenberg explains, when it comes to the modernity of the race concept, “there is 
room for doubt, and the scholarly expression of that doubt tends to cluster around Spain in the 
late Middle Ages” (2009, 241). Most historians of race, if they find the Middle Ages significant 
at all, focus on the Purity of Blood statutes of fifteenth-century Spain, which led to the 
expulsion of all Jews from the country in 1492. This date, also marking the arrival of Columbus 
in the “New World,” is often conventionally considered to mark the beginning of modernity. 
Were the Purity of Blood statutes (first issued in 1449) premised on a concept of race? If they 
were, then there was a pre-modern concept of race.  
For Ivan Hannaford—author of the only history of the idea of race in the west from antiquity 
to modernity—“it is unhistorical to perceive the concept of race before the appearance of 
physical anthropology proper, because the human body, as portrayed up to the time of the 
Renaissance and the Reformation, could not be detached from the ideas of polis and ecclesia” 
(1996, 147). While it is true that in fifteenth-century Spain, beliefs about Christian, Muslim, 
and Jewish bodies were attached to ecclesiastical ideas, there was a biological turn during this 
period that can arguably be understood as the beginnings of racial thought.  
This biological turn had to do with the crisis of classification that followed large-scale 
Jewish conversions to Christianity in the wake of the 1391 massacres. “By the middle of the 
fifteenth century,” writes Norman Roth, “a substantial converso class had been created. All 
doors were open to them as Christians, including those of the Church” (1992, 22). It was not 
long before the Cristianos nuevos (new Christians) ascended to positions of power and prestige 
barred to them and their ancestors as Jews—positions that Cristianos viejos (old Christians) 
fought ruthlessly to preserve. 
Cristianos viejos, also calling themselves Cristianos de natura, complained that it was 
impossible to tell a “natural Christian” from a “Jewish or Moorish convert.” “Failing in their 
efforts to enforce a legal distinction between old and new Christians, converso-phobes,” 
explains Roth, 
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evolved the first medieval example of true anti-Semitism, as opposed to anti-Jewish sentiment based on 
objections to Jewish religious tradition. According to the notorious doctrine of limpieza de sangre (purity 
of blood), Jews and Jewish converts to Christianity constituted a race. Jewish blood irreconcilably 
corrupted its possessor down to the fourth generation, despite intermarriage with old Christians. This 
doctrine removed the sincerity of converts and their descendants from consideration and made opposition 
to Jews a biological issue. Since “Jewish blood” remained to the fourth generation, such people were to be 
barred from holding public or ecclesiastical office or from studying in universities (Roth 1992, 23 emphasis 
added).  
 
Did the Purity of Blood Statutes constitute racial thinking, as Roth believes? I can think of 
two ways of resisting this conclusion, but neither of them is convincing. First, one could 
identify “race” exclusively with the scientific race theory to come, but this would be pure 
scientism. Second, one could identify “race” with color-coded, continental groupings rather 
than the religious “bloodlines” (the Jewish and Moorish “razas”) of fifteenth-century Spain. 
However, this presents us with a false dichotomy. As George Fredrickson explains, we can 
“trace the origins of the two main forms of modern racism—the color-coded white supremacist 
variety and the essentialist version of antisemitism—to the late medieval and early modern 
periods” (2002, 46). Just as neither version of racism is more racist than the other, color-coded 
“races” are no more “racial” than the “razas” of fifteenth-century Spain (or Jews in Nazi 
Germany). It would be arbitrary to conceptually privilege one type of racialization over the 
other. As Roth argues, the Purity of Blood Statutes did appeal to a concept of race, just not one 
that involved color-coding.  
There is now widespread agreement that, as Lynn Ramey writes, “It is not necessary to have 
the word ‘race’ to have the concept of race” (2014, 26; see also Heng 2018, 26; Mittman 2015, 
40; Thomas 2010, 1739). However, it turns out that the concept of race emerges at the same 
time as the term is first applied to human groups. As Nirenberg explains, 
 
…words like raza…were already embedded in identifiably biological ideas about animal breeding and 
reproduction in the first half of the fifteenth century…the sudden and explicit application of this vocabulary 
to Jews coincides chronologically (the 1430s) with the appearance of an anti-converso ideology…which 
sought to establish new religious categories and discriminations, and legitimate these by naturalizing their 
reproduction (Nirenberg 2009, 252). 
 
Perhaps for the first time in history, the potency of baptismal water was seriously brought into 
question. While this was a complex and ambivalent development, Jewish and Muslim identities 
began to be understood as “in the blood.” And blood, it turned out, was thicker than baptismal 
water. Jews and Muslims were not only labelled as “razas,” they were understood to be major 
human groups and lineages, formed due to reproductive isolation, in which group membership 
was biologically inherited. This marks a break with ancient and earlier medieval approaches to 
group membership. A change in religion, or a change in climate, could no longer change one’s 
bodily essence. It is unclear what we might call this new approach to group identity, where 
membership is determined by “blood,” if not by the name of “race.” So in response to our first 
question, which asks whether the concept of race is modern, we should answer in the negative. 
“Race” is not a modern concept. 
 
IS THERE A MODERN CONCEPT OF RACE THAT IS DISTINCT FROM EARLIER 
RACE CONCEPTS?  
 
Our second question asks whether there is a modern concept of race that is distinct from the 
earlier race concepts. As we have seen, a concept developed in the late Middle Ages which 
was recognizably racial. This concept contained the four following components: 
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(#1) Races form due to their reproductive isolation. 
(#2) Races constitute major human lineages. 
(#3) Races are major biological groups in the present. 
(#4) Race is biologically inherited. 
 
This may seem, at first glance, sufficiently similar to modern conceptions of race to conclude 
that there is not a uniquely modern concept of race. However, such a conclusion should be 
resisted.  
The following two claims distinguish modern from pre-modern concepts of race:  
 
(#5) All human populations belong to at least one race. 
(#6) Race is the taxonomic level below species in humans. 
 
Modern ideas about “race” are relational in a way that their medieval counterparts were not. 
“Race” came to be seen as something that not only some populations had: every population 
was thought to be a “racial” population (#5). There may be racially mixed populations, but not 
raceless populations. “Race” also came to be seen in a particular relation to the species 
concept—namely, as the taxonomic level below it (#6). 
These were genuinely modern innovations. Before 1492, there was no attempt to divide the 
entire human species into biological lineages (#5). Even in the early seventeenth century, 
Sebastian de Covarrubias defines “raza” in his dictionary as follows: “the caste of purebred 
horses, which are marked by a brand so that they can be recognized…. Race in [human] lineages 
is meant negatively, as in having some race of Moor or Jew” (as cited by Nirenberg 2009, 251). 
Only some groups were believed to be “racial” groups.  
And before 1492, “race” was not considered to be the taxonomic level below species (#6). 
There was no attempt to describe what we would now call human biological races or subspecies 
in antiquity or the Middle Ages. Aristotle was very clear about this. In Parts of Animals he 
observed that the human species is not divisible into smaller groups:  
 
By ‘common’ I mean those which belong to all animals; by ‘to a genus’, those of animals whose differences 
from one another we see to be matters of degree—Bird is a genus. Man is a species, and so is everything 
not differentiated into subordinate groups. In the first place the common attributes may be called analogous, 
in the second generic, in the third specific” (Aristotle 1984, 1005) 
 
A genus was seen as a broad class, divisible into species. The human species could not, 
according to Aristotle, be divided into subordinate, or subspecific groups.  
We can see the early development of modern race theory, and the first attempt to racialize 
the world, in François Bernier’s (1684) New Division of the Earth. While Bernier tells us that 
everyone (not just the Moors and the Jews) is raced (#5), he does not distinguish between the 
concepts of “race” and “species” (#6). His paper bears the full title Nouvelle Division de la 
Terre par les differentes Especes ou Races d’hommes qui l’habitent, envoyée par un fameux 
Voyageur à M. l’Abbé de la Chambre. This lack of distinction between species and race (found 
in the extended title and evident throughout his discussion) demonstrates that the theoretical 
status of “race” was still unclear.  
In 1950, Walter Scheidt argued that Immanuel Kant produced “the first theory of race which 
really merits that name,” and subsequent scholarship has reinforced this view (Scheidt 1950, 
372; see also Bernasconi 2001; Eze 1997; Larrimore 2008; Sloan 2014). While Claude-Olivier 
Doron emphasizes Comte de Buffon’s role in the formation of the modern race concept, he still 
acknowledges that “Kant… gave Buffon’s claims a decisive epistemological status” (Doron 
2012, 91).  
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What is so unique about Kant’s anthropological work to single him out as such an important 
figure in the history of “race?” It is not his influence, although he was influential (Bernasconi 
2001). Nor is it his radical break with earlier race theory, although his theory was unique in 
some respects (Mensch 2013). It is, rather, that Kant offered a division of the world’s human 
populations into four “races” (#5) and he also rigorously distinguished between “race” and 
“species” (#6). Even if confusion remained about whether the “races,” or some of them, could 
be separate species,2 Kant gave “the concept sufficient definition for subsequent users to 
believe that they were addressing something whose scientific status could at least be debated” 
(Bernasconi 2001, 11). Indeed, Kant’s student Johann Gottfried von Herder wrote a polemical 
reply, arguing that “there are neither four nor five races… The colors run into one another” 
(1828, 26). The race debate had begun, and race skeptics have been making the same argument 
as Herder ever since. 
There is enough of a difference between pre-modern and modern race concepts to justify a 
distinction between them. And in doing so, we have our first example of how asking “is ‘race’ 
modern?” without qualification gets us into trouble. If we are asking whether the concept of 
race is modern, then the answer is “no,” but if we are asking whether there is a modern concept 
of race that is distinct from the earlier race concepts, then the answer is “yes.”  
Consider the following claims: 
 
Race is a modern concept and a product of colonial encounters (Golash-Boza 2016, 130). 
 
Race is a modern category invented by white male scientists in the “era of modernity” (Brewer 2006, 513). 
 
...‘race’ is a modern construct dependent on the language of science (Dikötter 2015, ix). 
 
These theorists are all right in one sense, and wrong in another. They are right that there is a 
distinctively modern race concept that was a product of colonial encounters, and dependent on 
the language of science. However, they are wrong to identify this as the race concept. There 
was, as I have argued, a race concept that evolved earlier, in medieval Spain. So we should 
distinguish between our first question, “Is the concept of race modern?” and the second 
question, “Is there is a modern concept of race that is distinct from the earlier race concepts?” 
The answer to the first is “no,” while the answer the second is “yes.” 
 
ARE “RACES” THEMSELVES MODERN?   
 
Question three asks whether “races” themselves are modern. If we simply ask whether “race” 
is modern, it is unclear whether we are asking about the concept or the purported kind. Yet 
many race theorists are interested in when “races” themselves were first formed. How one 
answers this question will depend on whether one believes that “races” actually exist. In this 
section, I will argue that there are no races, and that the third question should be rejected, before 
arguing in the following section that it should be replaced with the fourth question, which is 
about “racialized groups” as distinct from “races.” 
Note that when race scholars ask whether “races” themselves are modern, they are not 
talking about race as a biological category. Most race theorists reject racial naturalism, so that 
question is not one that they would ask. Among the remaining race naturalists, it is universally 
accepted that so-called “racial boundaries” have been increasing blurred since modernity (e.g., 
Hardimon 2017; Spencer 2018a, 2018b). Nobody believes that biological races were formed in 
modernity. 
Yet most race theorists do believe that “race,” defined as a social kind, is a product of 
modernity (e.g. Goldberg 2002; Holt 2002; Mallon 2017; Mills 1998; Omi and Winant 2015).3 
The view that race is a social kind is often labelled “social constructionism about race,” and I 
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will be using this phrase to refer to the position.4 Social constructionists believe that the modern 
scientific and taxonomic project of describing “biological races” had the unintended effect of 
creating “social races.” The descriptive project was a failure, but the very act of labelling 
groups as races and treating them in different—and often horrendous—ways created a new 
social kind, which we call “race.”  
While this is the dominant account of the history of racial formation, it is not beyond doubt. 
We can thus ask whether “races,” as social groups, are indeed modern, or whether there were 
“social races” before modernity. To answer this question, we need a sense of what it means to 
say that “race” is real, but social. Ronald Sundstrom offers a helpful account. He writes that, 
“A kind is real when its members are unified—held together by a number of shared properties. 
The properties that unify a kind vary with the domain…. A biological kind is unified by some 
significant biological relation.… Similarly, a human [or social] kind is real when unified by a 
significant social relation” (2002, 95). So in order to answer our third question, which asks 
whether “races” themselves are modern, we need an account of “racial” social relations.  
It is common for such accounts to focus on essentialism as essential to racial social relations 
(e.g. Fredrickson 2002). Consider Heng’s definition: ““Race” is one of the primary names we 
have—a name we retain for the strategic, epistemological, and political commitments it 
recognizes—that is attached to a repeating tendency, of the gravest import, to demarcate 
human beings through differences among humans that are selectively essentialized as absolute 
and fundamental, in order to distribute positions and powers differentially to human groups” 
(2018, 3). 
Are social races modern on this definition of race? Heng (2018) argues that there were social 
races as early as the thirteenth century. Her focus is on Jewish-Christian relations in thirteenth-
century England, starting with the execution of the law (set out in the Fourth Lateran Council 
of 1215) that Jews and Muslims be set apart from Christians by a difference in dress and ending 
with the forced expulsion of all Jews from England in 1290:  
 
In England…the Jewish badge, expulsion order, legislative enforcements, surveillance and segregation, 
ritualized iterations of homicidal fables, and the legal execution of Jews are constitutive acts in the 
consolidation of a community of Christian English—otherwise internally fragmented and ranged along 
numerous divides—against a minority population that has, on these historical occasions and through these 
institutions and practices, entered into race (Heng 2018, 31). 
 
The treatment of the thirteenth-century English Jewry foreshadows the 20th century’s holocaust. 
Being a Jew in this period and place was much more than following a certain religious doctrine. 
It meant being positioned in a very particular location in the social hierarchy with economic, 
political, and legal consequences. Jews were essentialized, although imagined Jewish essences 
could transform though conversion (Resnick 2000). On Heng’s definition of race, thirteenth-
century English Jews do indeed count as a racial group.  
If we were to stop the discussion here, we would be answering “no” to the third question, 
which asks whether “races” themselves are modern. However, I have argued elsewhere that 
there is a problem with the definition of race above (Hochman 2017, 2019b). I argue that, on 
this definition, “race” loses its conceptual specificity. It creates false positives—allowing too 
many kinds of groups to count as races. We essentialize all sorts of groups in order to 
differentially distribute power between them. Ethnic groups are often essentialized, and so 
unracialized but essentialized ethnic groups would count as de facto races. Men and women are 
also essentialized and would belong to different races on the definition above. The same would 
be true of gay people, under certain conditions—a consequence that Heng (2018, 20) recognizes 
and appears to accept. The idea of a “gay race” goes beyond the sort of counterintuitive position 
that some philosophers enjoy defending. Instead, it amounts to a reductio ad absurdum. A 
social kind approach to race, applied consistently and taken to its logical conclusion, has 
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unacceptable consequences. When “race” loses its conceptual specificity, it loses its value as a 
conceptual resource (Hochman 2017, 2019b).   
Social constructionists might reply by arguing that the definition above only produces these 
counterintuitive consequences because it does not mention the body, or biology. A “race” is 
not simply a social group, it is a social group misinterpreted as a specific kind of biological 
group. As creators of racial formation theory Michael Omi and Howard Winant put it, “race is 
a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different 
types of human bodies” (2015, 110). This sounds right at first, but on reflection, it would seem 
to entail that males and females count as separate “races.” However, couldn’t a more nuanced 
definition solve the specificity problem? 
I do not believe that it could. As Heng has argued, canonical race theory has been blind to 
its own radicality. “So tenacious has been scientific racism’s account of race, with its 
entrenchment of high modernist racism as the template of all racisms, that it is still routinely 
understood, in everyday life and much of scholarship, that properly racial logic and behavior 
must invoke biology and the body as their referent” (Heng 2018, 19). That is a mistake. Once 
race is redefined as a social kind, we can no longer assume that biologization is necessary for 
racial formation. In other words, social constructionists cannot simply help themselves to 
criteria of biologization in their definitions of social race. If biologization is not necessary for 
the formation of groups with the social properties and relations constructionists identify as 
“racial,” then such biologization is not definitional of race. What Heng shows with her example 
of Christian-Jewish relations in thirteenth-century England is that it is possible to produce the 
sort of social groups that constructionists call “races” without the biologization usually 
associated with “race.” Yet when we strip definitions of race of these unjustified references to 
biologization, a social kind approach to race is susceptible to a reductio argument.  
Social constructionists could try to avoid the reductio by using more nuanced social criteria. 
This is exactly how Phila Msimang (2019) defends social constructionism in his response to 
my critique. Msimang offers what he calls the minimalist account of social race. He maintains 
that, “The characteristics of a social race are that they are stereotyped groups,” about which 
there is a “presumption that racial identity is fixed” and a “belief that race is a genealogical and 
heritable kind of group belonging” (Msimang 2019, 15). This shows how constructionists can 
avoid the implication that the sexes are races (sex does not fit the genealogy condition). 
However, Msimang’s account does not avoid the reductio. The thirteenth-century English Jews 
would still count as a race, as they saw themselves as the chosen people (thus meeting the 
stereotyping condition) and they understood Jewishness as fixed and matrilineal (meeting the 
fixity and genealogy conditions). Gay people would also count as a race in certain contexts, 
because stereotypes about gay people are common, and homosexuality has often been 
understood as fixed and heritable. Many other sorts of groups that are surely not races meet 
Msimang’s three conditions of stereotyping, fixity, and genealogy as well, including 
unracialized ethnic groups. Msimang’s minimalist account of social race fails to save race as 
an analytic category. 
Social constructionists might respond by looking for alternatives to a social kind 
interpretation of their position. For instance, they could defend the view that social races exist 
as socially ascribed groups. However, social constructionists have avoided this position 
because of their legitimate concerns about reification. Constructionists do not want to say that 
races are simply those groups that have been labelled as races, because this would be akin to 
the claim that witches are simply people accused of being witches. There must be something 
more, they believe, to being a race. The claim that race is a social kind is a way of capturing 
this “something more.” However, as I have argued, when race is defined socially, it loses its 
conceptual specificity and its usefulness as an analytic category. As such, we ought to reject 
social definitions of race altogether. In response to our third question, “are races themselves 
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modern?” we should reject the question itself. Races are not anything, because races do not 
exist. 
 
ARE RACIALIZED GROUPS MODERN? 
 
If races don’t exist, is our race-talk tracking anything at all? Appiah (1996) has argued that 
while there are no races, there are racial identities. However, this formulation does not quite 
capture the way in which groups have been racialized. I believe that race-talk is best understood 
as tracking racialized groups (see also Blum 2002, 2010; Darder and Torres 2003; Hochman 
2017, 2019b; Miles 1989; Small 1994). Lawrence D. Bobo explains that, “like most social 
scientists, I have grown comfortable in the thought that we study race without actually believing 
in race” (2008, x). However, the concept of racialization offers a way out of this apparent 
paradox or tension. Social scientists study race concepts, racialization, racialized groups, and 
racism, but not “race” itself. The third question—which asks whether “races” themselves are 
modern—should be replaced by the fourth, which asks whether racialized groups are modern. 
What, then, is the difference between a “race” and a racialized group? For most race 
theorists, there is no such distinction—the terms are used as synonyms (e.g. Goldberg 1992; 
Haslanger 2000; Mallon 2018). The distinction I wish to draw is therefore prescriptive, rather 
than descriptive. That distinction is as follows: “race” is a purported biological or social kind, 
whereas a racialized group is a group which is misunderstood to be a biological race.5 More 
specifically, a racialized group is a group understood to be a major biological entity and human 
lineage, formed through reproductive isolation, in which membership is transmitted by 
biological descent.  
I define “racialized groups” as groups subject to a specific form of biologization because 
this offers the kind of conceptual and historical specificity that is lost on a social definition of 
“race.” Recall that the thirteenth-century English Jews appear to count as a “race” on a social 
kind approach to race. Let’s see whether they were a racialized group, on my definition of the 
term. Given the numerous Christian beliefs about Jewish bodies in the middle ages—that they 
had horns, an identifying stink, etc.—this is not an unreasonable question to ask. However, in 
doing so, it is important to distinguish between biologization in general and the very specific 
form of biologization that is racialization. As I will argue, the thirteenth-century Jews were 
biologized, but they were not racialized. 
Consider the medieval myth of Jewish male menstruation. As Irven Resnick (2000) explains, 
while Christian beliefs about Jewish males menstruation focused on the body, Jewish 
physiology was not believed to be the cause of the bleeding. The cause was believed to be 
mystical, rather than biological. Jewish male menstruation was understood to be the effect of a 
curse for alleged deicide, and the imagined bleeding was thought to cease upon conversion to 
Christianity. So long as Jewish bodies could transform through conversion, Jews could be 
biologized, but they could not be racialized. Racialization is a very specific form of 
biologization, according to which membership in a biological lineage—not one’s religion or 
environment—determines one’s physical traits.  
So thirteenth-century Jews were not a racialized group. When did racialization first take 
place? Above I argued that the concept of race first emerges in the late middle ages, in Spain, 
and that this concept was applied to the Jews and the Moors. If a racialized group is a group 
understood to be a biological race, then racialization first took place in the mid-fifteenth 
century, in Spain. The labelling of the Jews (and also the Moors) as “razas,” and naturalizing 
their reproduction as “in the blood,” can be usefully understood as an instance of racialization. 
In response to the fourth question we should answer in the negative. Racialized groups are not 
modern—they are late medieval.  
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We can see the conflation of “race” and racialized group—the third question with the 
fourth—in James Thomas’ (2010) article The racial formation of medieval Jews: a challenge 
to the field. Racial formation theory endorses a realist social ontology of race (Omi and Winant 
2015). Racial formation is supposed to be the process or processes through which social races 
are formed (which is usually—but not always—understood to involve biologization). Thomas 
claims, as the title of his article indicates, that racial formation took place in the Middle Ages. 
However, he does not appear to argue that medieval Jews were actually a race. He writes, for 
instance, that “the denial of all New Christians in fifteenth-century Spain the right to public 
office for all time, present and future, was predicated on the belief that Jews were a race that, 
even through conversion, could not be cured of their innate Jewishness” (Thomas 2010, 1752). 
The key point here is that fifteenth-century Spanish Jews were understood to be a race, not that 
they in fact were a race. Thomas is not arguing that racial formation—the formation of races—
is medieval. Rather, he is arguing that racialization is medieval. 
Where racial formation is supposed to form “races,” racialization is best understood as the 
process or processes through which racialized groups are formed.6 This distinction is seldom 
recognized. Just as most race theorists use “race” and “racialized group” as synonyms, they use 
“racial formation” and “racialization” synonymously as well (e.g. Goldberg 1992; Haslanger 
2000; Mallon 2018). However, as I noted above, there is a tradition of race skeptics who use 
the term “racialization” as an alternative to race-realist concepts such as “racial formation” (see 
Blum 2002, 2010; Darder and Torres 2003; Hochman 2017, 2019b; Miles 1988, 1989; Small 
1994).  
Maintaining a distinction between “racialization and “racial formation” is crucial. The 
racialization that Thomas describes in fifteenth-century Spain did not bring a social kind 
(“race”) into existence, so it did not constitute racial formation. There is too much continuity 
on the social level to maintain that racialization created a new social kind called race. In both 
the English and the Spanish cases, Jews were made to wear identifying badges, they were the 
subjects of homicidal fables, they were legally executed, and they were all eventually expelled 
from their countries. The central difference, from a social perspective, was that in the thirteenth-
century, Jews could still convert. However, there were already social barriers to conversion, 
and as Robert Stacey explains, “By the middle of the thirteenth century in England, there was 
clearly an irreducible [though non-biological] element to Jewish identity in the eyes of many 
Christians, which no amount of baptismal water could entirely eradicate…. Through baptism, 
converts from Judaism became Christians, but this did not mean that they had entirely ceased 
to be Jews in the eyes of their brothers and sisters in Christ” (Stacey 1992, 278).  
The similarities between the treatment of Jews in thirteenth-century England and fifteenth-
century Spain are striking. It would be difficult to maintain that in the former they were an 
ethno-religious grouping but that in the latter they were a totally new social kind—a “race.” 
Racialization was a new, biological, interpretation of identity. This biologization had 
consequences—some of the most terrible consequences of world history—but the formation of 
a new social kind was not one of them. 
If my analysis is good, then we should reject the third question, which asks whether races 
themselves are modern, along with race-realist concepts such as “racial formation.” We should 
ask, rather, whether racialized groups are modern. I have argued that they are not: that 
racialization first took place in the middle of the fifteenth-century, in Spain. If we adopt the 
conventional dating of modernity as beginning in 1492, then racialized groups are pre-modern 
in origin.  
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ARE THE MEANS AND METHODS ASSOCIATED WITH RACIALIZATION 
MODERN? 
 
Let us move on then to the fifth question: “are the means and methods associated with 
racialization modern?” Continuity theorists who are ostensibly answering the third question, 
“are ‘races’ themselves modern?” can be read as answering, among other questions, the fifth 
question. If this is right—and I will make the case that it is—it further demonstrates the value 
of disambiguating the question “is ‘race’ modern?” While the work of continuity theorists is 
certainly taken seriously by many, others will dismiss it as presentist and anachronistic (Jordan 
2001; Seth 2005). Yet if we interpret the continuity theorists as investigating the origins of the 
means and methods associated with racialization, rather than as discovering pre-modern 
“races,” the relevance and value of their work should become clear. 
Discontinuity theorists—who believe that “race” is modern—argue that the means and 
methods associated with racialization are unique to modernity. “Race” is modern, discontinuity 
theorists argue, because it is intimately linked with the industrialization and global capitalism 
that they identify as uniquely modern, along with the rise of the modern nation state (Holt 
2002). It was the brutal exploitation by Europeans of, in particular, sub-Saharan Africans and 
Native Americans which financed the industrialization associated with modernity, while the 
transatlantic slave trade paved the way for global capitalism. As for modern nation states, these 
are, as David Theo Goldberg (2002) argues, racial states: states ordered around racial divisions 
and hierarchies, aided by law, bureaucratic apparatuses such as the census, and invented 
histories.  
The work of continuity theorists challenges the dominant view that “Modernity and Race 
helped bring each other into existence” (Taylor 2004, 23). Thomas explains that, “By and large 
the study of race and racism within the social sciences seeks to understand the development 
and maintenance of racial classificatory systems through a model of imperialist global 
economic expansion and development, rather than seeing it as a historically complex process 
over a much larger period of time” (2010, 1752). While I have argued that continuity theorists 
such as Thomas are mistaken in their belief that racial formation occurred before modernity 
(because there are no races, only racialized groups), they have, I believe, successfully 
demonstrated that some of the means and methods associated with racialization are pre-modern.  
To illustrate with an example, let us consider the claim that “race” is modern because of its 
connection to the modern nation state. “Race,” writes David Theo Goldberg, “is not a 
premodern condition but a quintessentially modern one masquerading in the guise of the given 
and the ancient, bloodlines and genetic pools. States have acquired their modernity more or less 
and partially through racial assumption, through being drawn into the terms and forms, shapes 
and spaces, temporalities and rhythms of racial world ordering and world racial definition” 
(2002, 240). If we follow Goldberg, “race” must be modern, because it developed hand-in-hand 
with modern nation states. 
In the quote above, the question “is ‘race’ modern?” appears as a question not about a 
concept or a kind, but a “condition.” It is difficult to evaluate Goldberg’s claim without 
knowing what it means for “race” to be a “condition.” Nevertheless, in medieval Europe the 
church acted in many ways like a modern nation state. “The church’s bid for an overarching 
authority and uniformity,” writes Heng, “importantly furnished medieval societies with an 
array of models on how to consolidate unity, power, and collective identity across internal 
differences. A church with universalist ambitions in effect sought to function like a state, a state 
without borders” (2018, 32). If the medieval church acted like modern nation states, and modern 
nation states are racialized states, then when it comes to racialization, the so-called “dark ages” 
can shed light on the present. 
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Continuity theorists are, I have argued, mistaken to claim that thirteenth-century English 
Jews were a “social race.” They were not even a racialized group, but were rather an ethno-
religious group subject to structural persecution. However, the ways in which thirteenth-century 
English Jews were persecuted informed the racialization of later medieval and modern periods. 
Jews were already made to wear identifying badges in thirteenth-century England; laws were 
enforced that restricted the sorts of work they were allowed to perform; there were state-
endorsed executions; and finally, in 1290, all Jews were exiled from the country. There is a 
striking continuity in the treatment of the Jewish populations in thirteenth-century England, 
fifteenth-century Spain, and 20th-century Germany. It was in fifteenth-century Spain that Jews 
were first racialized, but this racialization did not appear out of thin air. Rather, it built upon 
previous historical developments. While continuity theorists want to show that “races” 
themselves are pre-modern, what they have actually shown is that some of the means and the 
methods associated with racialization are not entirely modern.  
 
ARE THE MEANINGS ATTACHED TO RACIALIZED TRAITS MODERN? 
 
Moving on to our sixth question, also about racialization, we ask, “are the meanings attached 
to racialized traits modern?” Continuity theorists can not only be interpreted as asking whether 
the means and methods associated with racialization are modern, they can also be interpreted 
as asking whether the meanings attached to racialized traits are modern.  
Much of the work answering question six focuses on skin color. “The study of race in the 
Middle Ages,” notes Cord Whitaker, has “largely focused on the deployment of blackness in 
literature and history and the dynamics it registers, creates and reifies” (Whitaker 2015, 8). 
Blackness is typically considered to be the quintessentially racial trait, so this is unsurprising. 
In Before Color Prejudice Frank Snowden argues that despite “the association of blackness 
with ill omens, demons, the devil, and sin, there is in the extant records no stereotyped image 
of Ethiopians as the personification of demons or the devil” (1991, 107). Nevertheless, the 
negative associations attached to blackness (which were inconsistently applied to dark-skinned 
people in antiquity) may be relevant to the development of later color prejudice and, later still, 
color-coded racism. 
Regardless of the level of skin color prejudice in antiquity, Cord Whitaker notes that, “the 
logic of race, with regard to whiteness and blackness, is already deeply ingrained in Latin 
Christian culture by the late Middle Ages” (Whitaker 2015, 5). Indeed there are numerous 
historical sources demonstrating that as early as the thirteenth century, medieval societies were 
preoccupied with skin color, coding dark skin as “evil” and white skin color as “good” (Hahn 
2001; Lampert 2004; Ramey 2014). 
White supremacist ideology proper may be modern (Mills 1998). However, it partly grew 
out of an earlier medieval discourse on skin color. That discourse is not well understood as 
racist, because until around the middle of the fifteenth century there was no concept of race. It 
was, rather, colorist. Whitaker takes this colorism to have a bearing on “whether race matters 
to the Middle Ages” (2015, 7). However, what this work on skin color shows is not that “race 
matters to the Middle Ages,” but rather that some of the meanings attached to some racialized 
traits are pre-modern in origin. 
Consider the following example from fourteenth-century English literature. In The King of 
Tars, a sultan converts to Christianity and his skin color miraculously changes from dark to 
light. Whiteness, in this fable, is an outward sign of goodness. Thomas Hahn considers The 
King of Tars and other earlier examples in medieval literature in his cautious defense of the 
continuity thesis. He concedes that “Black and white as terms of racial difference may have 
been less stable in the twelfth century than they have been in the bitterly contested discourses 
of the last centuries” (Hahn 2001, 24). However, what tales such as The King of Tars suggest 
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is not that the connection between skin color and race was still unstable at the time it was 
written. Rather, The King of Tars suggests that there was no concept of race in this period. 
“Race” is meant to be heritable, biological—it cannot be altered through spiritual 
transformation. 
The King of Tars is evidence that dark skin color was coded as evil and light skin color as 
good before skin color was racialized. Skin color can only be racialized if it is understood to be 
biologically heritable: that is a part of what it means for a trait to be racialized. Continuity 
theorists have been tempted into claiming that “race” itself is, in some sense, pre-modern, 
because the associations we have with a currently racialized trait—skin color—are pre-modern. 
However, those associations were not “racial” at the time.  
It would be a mistake to dismiss medieval interpretations of skin color as irrelevant to the 
history of racialization. What The King of Tars actually shows is that the meanings associated 
with racialized traits (such as skin color) started forming before the concept of race emerged, 
and before racialization first took place. This answers our sixth and final question. No, the 
meanings attached to racialized traits are not exclusively modern.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Race scholars have been unable to agree about whether “race” is modern partly, I have argued, 
because the question itself is ambiguous. They have been answering at least six different 
questions. Some are interested in whether the concept of race is modern (1), others in whether 
there is a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race concepts (2). Continuity 
theorists are interested in whether there were actual social races before modernity (3). I have 
argued that social definitions of race lead to conceptual inflation and should be abandoned. The 
third question is therefore wrongheaded. We should ask, instead, whether racialized groups are 
modern (4). From this perspective, the work on the historical origins of social races is 
misguided, but still valuable: misguided because there are no races, only racialized groups; 
valuable because this literature answers the following two questions: “are the means and 
methods associated with racialization modern?” (5), and “are the meanings associated with 
racialized traits modern?” (6). 
I have answered the six questions as follows: (1) no, the concept of race is not modern, it is 
late medieval; (2) yes, there are modern concepts of race that are distinct from the race concept 
used in fifteenth-century Spain; (3) no, races are not modern, because there are no races, only 
racialized groups; (4) no, racialized groups are not modern: the Jews and the Moors were 
racialized in Spain in the mid-fifteenth-century; (5) no, the means and methods associated with 
racialization are not exclusively modern, as illustrated by the example of Christian-Jewish 
relations in thirteenth-century England; (6) and no, the meanings attached to racialized traits 
are not modern either, as illustrated by medieval discourse on skin color. 
If I am right that there are racialized groups, but no actual races, then only three of the six 
questions that race scholars have been answering are actually about “race.” The other three are 
about racialization, the process or processes that produces racialized groups, not “races.” One 
of the three questions about race (“are ‘races’ themselves modern?”) is misguided, so that 
leaves only two questions about whether “race” is modern—those about race as a concept. So 
race scholars are not only answering different questions, half of these questions are not even 
directly about race, but are rather about racialization and racialized groups.  
Given that race scholars have been answering not one but at least six questions, it is not 
surprising that there is still no consensus about whether “race” is modern. The only way in 
which the debate about periodization and “race” can be settled is if we disambiguate the 
question. My particular answers to the six questions may be controversial. The aim of this paper 
has not been to necessarily convince the reader that my answers are correct (though I have 
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certainly attempted to do so). It has been, more modestly, to demonstrate that a more nuanced 
approach to the history of “race” and racialization can move the debate in the right direction.  
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6 My definition of “racialization” is thin, but for good reason. Racialization is a complex process, and as Barbara 
fields has pointed out, “Not all racializers do the same thing when they racialize” (2001, 50). For this reason, I 
have defined racialization as an outcome—a particular form of biologization—rather than a particular action. It is 
up to the race scholar to answer the “who,” “how,” and “why” questions: “who is doing the racializing?” “how is 
racialization operating in this particular context?” and “why is it being done?” All the label “racialization” tells us 
is that a group is being misunderstood as a biological race. On this view, were a group to be called a “race” without 
being biologized, it would not be racialized (it may be some other sort of group, such as an ethnic group). On the 
other hand, this view recognizes covert racialization: racialization where the group is not explicitly called a “race,” 
but is being biologized “racially” nevertheless. 
 
